This document describes how to report vulnerabilities in dataeval-flow and how the maintainers triage findings from
automated scanners. It is the project's response to JATIC SDP requirement DSOR-1-H-3 (false positives must be dismissed
with a documented justification).
Do not open a public GitLab or GitHub issue for a security vulnerability. Email dataeval-flow@ariacoustics.com with:
- A description of the issue and its impact
- Steps to reproduce (a minimal config / dataset / command line is ideal)
- Affected versions / commits / container tags
- Your name and (optionally) a credit preference for the eventual advisory
You can expect:
- An acknowledgment within 3 business days
- A triage decision (accepted / false positive / duplicate) within 10 business days
- A fix or mitigation plan within 30 business days for accepted Hard findings, tracked against the next
v0.x.yrelease
For non-security bugs, follow the regular process in CONTRIBUTING.md.
Only the latest minor release on the main line receives security backports today. Once dataeval-flow reaches JATIC
Maturity I (target v1.0.0, see ROADMAP.md), supported-version windows will widen per JATIC SDP RS-5-S-1.
| Version | Status | Security backports |
|---|---|---|
0.3.x (current alpha) |
active | yes |
| anything older | unsupported | no |
Every merge request and every main pipeline runs four security scans (see .gitlab-ci.yml):
| Scanner | Scope | SDP requirement | Suppression file / mechanism |
|---|---|---|---|
| Semgrep (SAST) | source code | DSOR-1-H-1 / DSOR-1-H-2 | sast_excluded_paths input + per-rule nosem: comment |
| Gemnasium | Python dependency manifest | DSOR-2-H-1 / DSOR-2-H-2 | GitLab vulnerability-report dismissal (with comment) |
| GitLab Container Scanning (Trivy analyzer) | published container images | DSOR-3-H-1 / DSOR-3-H-2 / CS-2-H-2 | GitLab Vulnerability Report dismissal (with comment) |
| GitLab Secret Detection | working tree | DSOR-4-H-1 / DSOR-4-H-2 | SECRET_DETECTION_EXCLUDED_PATHS on the job; no secrets |
Findings flow into the GitLab security dashboard. Cosign attestation (cosign attest --type cyclonedx) is also
published per image for downstream verification (CS-2-H-4).
All container base images referenced by this project, both the runtime variants in docker/ and the helper
images used by CI jobs in .gitlab-ci.yml (python:slim, mambaorg/micromamba,
ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv, docker:25.0.5-git, alpine:latest, etc.), are pulled through the program-owned JATIC GitLab
registry / pull-through proxy. The registry is the trust boundary: images that are not on the program's approved list
cannot be fetched by the runners, regardless of what a Dockerfile or CI job declares. CS-1-S-2 is therefore satisfied
at the infrastructure layer, not the repo layer. No per-image attestation is maintained in this repository.
The same workflow applies whether the finding came from SAST, dependency scanning, container scanning, or secret detection.
-
Verify it is a false positive. Read the rule / CVE description, inspect the code or dependency, and confirm the finding does not apply to how
dataeval-flowuses the affected component. If you are unsure, treat it as a true positive and fix. -
Get a second opinion. Security suppressions land via a normal MR reviewed by a maintainer. The MR description must link to the finding (Semgrep rule ID, CVE, secret-rule ID) and to any upstream advisory or discussion that supports the dismissal.
-
Record the suppression in the right place. The justification text must be specific to this project. Generic statements like "not exploitable in our case" without context will be rejected in review.
-
For Semgrep / SAST:
- Per line, add
# nosem: <rule-id> # Justification: <reason>on the triggering line. - Per file or per directory, add the path to the
sast_excluded_pathsinput of thepython-securitycomponent in .gitlab-ci.yml with an inline# <reason>comment above the change. It listsconfig,docker,docs,outputandteststoday. - Per analyzer, extend the
sast_excluded_analyzersinput only when a whole analyzer is out of scope. It excludes the analyzers for JavaScript, Go, PHP, Java, .NET, Elixir, Apex and Kubernetes manifests today, because the project ships only Python.
- Per line, add
-
For Gemnasium / dependency scan:
- The preferred fix is to bump the offending package in
[tool.uv].constraint-dependencies(a constraint, not a runtime dep). See the existing CVE pins in pyproject.toml. - When a fix is not yet available upstream, dismiss the finding in the GitLab vulnerability report with a comment
containing:
- CVE ID
- Why the project is not exploitable (for example, the affected API is never called, or the vulnerable code path requires untrusted input that does not reach it)
- A re-evaluation date (typically 90 days out)
- The preferred fix is to bump the offending package in
-
For container scanning (the GitLab
container_scanningjob, one for each image variant, Trivy analyzer):- Suppressions live in the GitLab Vulnerability Report, not in a file in the repo. Open the finding, select
"Dismiss", choose a reason and leave a comment containing:
- CVE ID
- Why the project is not exploitable, specific to how the affected component is used in our images. Generic statements will be rejected at audit.
- A re-evaluation date (90d for HIGH/CRITICAL, 180d for MEDIUM)
- The severity gate is set via
CS_SEVERITY_THRESHOLDin .gitlab-ci.yml. The container-scanning job'sallow_failure: falseensures un-dismissed findings at or above that threshold fail the pipeline.
- Suppressions live in the GitLab Vulnerability Report, not in a file in the repo. Open the finding, select
"Dismiss", choose a reason and leave a comment containing:
-
For Secret Detection:
- True positives must be rotated immediately (the secret is already in git history, so assume it is compromised)
and the commit purged with
git filter-repoif it was added in the same MR. - False positives (test fixtures, public keys, example tokens) belong in
tests/fixtures/and the path added toSECRET_DETECTION_EXCLUDED_PATHSon thesecret_detectionjob in .gitlab-ci.yml, with an inline justification. The job sets no exclusions today.
- True positives must be rotated immediately (the secret is already in git history, so assume it is compromised)
and the commit purged with
-
-
Set an expiry. All non-CVE-fixable dismissals carry a re-evaluation date (90 days for HIGH/CRITICAL, 180 days for MEDIUM). When the date passes, the suppression must be removed or re-justified. There are no indefinite dismissals.
The set of active suppressions is reviewed at every release cut:
- The release-prep checklist (see BRANCHING.md) requires walking the GitLab Vulnerability Report
dismissal history (for both the dependency-scanning and container-scanning analyzers) and any in-line
nosem:comments in the source to confirm each justification is still valid. - Suppressions whose re-evaluation date has passed without renewal block the release.
- The aggregate count of active suppressions is reported in the release notes so it is visible to downstream consumers.
The project ships no hardcoded secrets (DSOR-4-H-2). The Cosign private key used to sign container images is supplied
via the COSIGN_PRIVATE_KEY_B64 CI variable. Only the corresponding public key is committed (see
docker/cosign.pub). If you discover what looks like a credential, password, token, or private key
in this repository, even in a test fixture, report it via the channel above. Do not file a public issue.