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The SSO provider's remote sign-out is not authenticated, so another site can end a user's sign-in #3204
GET /account/sso/{name}/signout is the front-channel logout path of an SSO provider. The cookie of the hosted pages holds neither the provider's sid nor its iss, so the handler has nothing to compare the request's parameters with: for a user who signed in through that provider, the request ends the cookie whatever it carries. The second review of #3199 sent it with ?sid=made-up&iss=https://evil.example and the cookie was gone (200).
A genuine front-channel logout loads the path in an iframe on the provider's page (OpenID Connect Front-Channel Logout 1.0, section 3), where a SameSite=Lax cookie is not sent; the requests that do reach the cookie are top-level navigations, which any site can cause. So today the path mostly serves a forged sign-out and rarely a real one.
For this reason #3198 does not revoke the session's authorizations at the remote sign-out.
Expected
Authenticate the provider's sign-out before it ends anything, then let it end the session and its authorizations as a logout does (#3198). Either keep the provider's sid and iss in the sign-in cookie and require both to match, or support Back-Channel Logout with its signed logout token, which needs no cookie and works where the iframe does not. Say in the specification which one a provider must be set up for.
Acceptance
A request to the sign-out path whose sid and iss do not match the sign-in ends nothing.
A genuine sign-out of the provider ends the server session and revokes its authorizations.
Tests for both, and for a sign-in made another way (password, another provider), which is left as it is.
Activity
Revoke the session's authorizations at end-session (#3199)